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I Introduction
The entrepreneur embodies a scarce and dis-
tinctive amalgam of vision, drive, creativity,
acquisitiveness and opportunism which
enabled him or her to .. combine factors of
production in innovative ways to create wealth
both for him/herself and for society as a whole.
As such, the notion ïs inextricable from both
markets and the profit motive ... It is also part
of the private realm of society as opposed to the
public realm of the state or the associational
realm of 'civil society' which operate with dif-
ferent sets of motives and behavioural codes.
(Gordon White, unpublished MS)1
Conventional notions of entrepreneurship are infre-
quently applied to government behaviour and, as
Gordon White pointed out in the paper cited above,
are even further removed from discussions of social
welfare provision. The concept of entrepreneurship,
rooted as it is in the analysis of economic behaviour
in the context of competitive markets, contrasts with
behaviour conventionally associated with public sec-
tor managers or with those responsible for welfare
provision. The Chinese experience may, however,
provide counter examples - of entrepreneurial local
states and of 'welfare entrepreneurship'. In post-Mao
China, there is considerable evidence not only that
government officials exhibit the characteristics of
entrepreneurs in directly engaging with business as
well as indirectly facilitating market development,
but also that wealth thus created is in certain cir-
cumstances used to fulfil the more traditional roles
of government including welfare provision. This
article asks whether local officials have been entre-
preneurial in the cause of welfare provision. Or, put
differently, do welfare responsibilities influence the
behaviour of local government officials in their
engagement in, or relationship with, local business?
Although the sharp dichotomies between public
and private sector behaviour have been eroded in
the context of shifting ideologies concerning state
This article arises from research initiated jointly with
Gordon White who was, and remains through his work,
a rich source of ideas and inspiration. I am grateful to
Bob Benewick and Lu Yuelai for valuable comments on
this article, and to Lu Yuelai for research assistance.
1 Gordon White, unfinished MS on 'Welfare
entrepreneurship'.
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and market, and within recent debates over welfare
provision and the behaviour of public officials,
nonetheless, the applicability of the term entrepre-
neurship to the field of welfare provision appears
unlikely' (White nd.; White and Shang nd.).2 In
the paper cited above, Gordon was exploring the
emergence of 'welfare entrepreneurship' in China,
that is, the efforts of government agencies to expand
into unconventional activities in order to finance
and deliver public and social goods. Earlier work on
urban business had recognised entrepreneurship
outside the usual sphere of business, including the
efforts of the Communist Party 'to stimulate entre-
preneurial behaviour on the part of state managers
as well as private businessmen' (Gold 1988:20). The
type of entrepreneurial state activity which emerged
in China's countryside was not, however, initially
promoted by the Party or higher level government;
rather, the changing structure of incentives (whether
intentional or not) led to its rapid spread.
Gordon's work on welfare in China, and his explo-
ration of 'welfare entrepreneurship', primarily
focused on urban welfare, but his interests had more
recently extended to rural welfare provision.3 The
collective (township and village) administrative level,
which is primarily responsible for the provision and
financing of welfare to the rural population, is also
the level where the greatest entrepreneurial behav-
iour by government officials is observed. Here I thus
draw on debates about the nature of the local
Chinese state, as developmental and entrepreneurial
(White 1991; Blecher 1991) or corporatist (Oi
1992). These debates focus on the unique institu-
tional experiments in local economic development
which emerged during the 1980s, and of which the
rapid growth of township and village enterprises is
among the most remarkable and remarked upon
phenomenon. The pattern of development appeared
to challenge predictions of established theories of
transition, in particular that bureaucrats will resist
changes that reduce their own power, that they are
motivated by rent-seeking opportunities, and that
clearly defined property rights are a prerequisite for
successful economic development.4
The wider use of 'entrepreneur' is, however, becoming
more common; for example Tony Blair has described as
'social entrepreneurs' 'those people who bring to social
problems the same enterprise and imagination that
business entrepreneurs bring to wealth creation'.
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Numerous studies of township and village economic
growth have examined the role of rural industriali-
sation, and the fiscal and other incentives for the
local state to generate income through enterprise
promotion. Little explicit attention has been paid to
the welfare implications, beyond the general impact
of growth on income levels and employment, and to
some extent a concern with growing income
inequality and social stratification. However, many
studies do observe the channelling of resources
towards welfare purposes. In this article I examine
the locus of responsibility for provision and financ-
ing of welfare, and the contribution of local state
entrepreneurship to meeting these responsibilities.
In conclusion, I discuss the implications for welfare
provision of two policy initiatives which may affect
the behaviour of local officials and the nature of the
local state: (a) proposed changes in the fiscal system
and their implications for the capacity of local gov-
ernments to raise and retain funds; and (b) the vil-
lage governance agenda.
2 Development, Entrepreneurship
and The Local State
Two types of entrepreneurship have been the focus of
much attention in the literature on China's rural eco-
nomic transformation during the past two decades.
First, in response to changing incentives and market
opportunities, formerly collectivised peasants moved
rapidly into new areas of economic activity as farm-
ers and private business entrepreneurs. Many cadres,
fearful of whether local initiatives would obtain the
approval of the central authorities, initially opposed
private entrepreneurial activity and wealth creation.
Such opposition appeared to support arguments,
based largely on Eastern European experience, that
government bureaucrats or 'redistributors' would
lose power to 'producers' - the new entrepreneurs -
during the transition to a market economy (Kornai
1992; Nee 1989, 1991; Rona-Tas 1994). However,
local entrepreneurship in many cases occurred with
at least the tacit support of local government leaders,
and expanded rapidly once the central government
signalled its approval.
The fieldwork which is drawn on in part of this article
was undertaken through a project initiated jointly by
Gordon and myself, and funded by a DFID ESCOR grant.
There is a considerable literature on property rights in
China, particularly in TVEs. This issue is not addressed
in this article.
Indeed, local government officials themselves
emerged as an entrepreneurial class, taking advan-
tage of opportunities to capitalise on their networks
and access to resources in the partially reformed
economy (Cook 1998). Such officials were instru-
mental in establishing collective (township and vil-
lage) enterprises or in supporting private or
quasi-private 'red hat' enterprises. Incentives to
operate in this manner were largely embedded in
the fiscal system, specifically the capacity of local
governments to raise and retain extra-budgetary
funds. A major potential source of such funds are
township and village enterprises (TVEs).
The collective, particularly township, level of gov-
ernment emerged with a pivotal role in local eco-
nomic development soon after the creation of
townships to replace the communes in the mid-
1980s. Formal government structures end at the
county level. Below this, townships and villages -
referred to as 'collectives' - fulfil a range of govern-
ment functions with specified responsibilities, lim-
ited power, and some mechanisms of
accountability at each level. A major responsibility
of the collective is the provision of social welfare.
While the collective has no formal tax-raising pow-
ers, its capacity to raise other (extra-budgetary)
revenues in the absence of significant transfers
from higher levels determines its ability to fulfil
these responsibilities. From the mid-1980s rural
enterprises - particularly TVEs - provided the
major source of growth in the local economies, and
thus in local government revenues. By 1990 they
provided over three times the total revenue raised
through agricultural taxes, accounting for 37 per
cent of all fiscal revenues at and below the county
level (Wong et al. 1995:108).
This unanticipated performance challenged con-
ventional thinking on the adaptability of public offi-
cials during transition, and gave rise to debates
about the nature of the 'local state'. Since the late
1980s, researchers have examined the incentives
provided by the decentralised fiscal system and the
capacity of local governments to retain extra-bud-
getary revenues as key factors in explaining the
entrepreneurial involvement of local officials in col-
lective industry, as well as their relationship with
See also Duckett (1996) for a development of this
argument in the context of entrepreneurship.among
municipal government agencies.
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private business. The main 'models' of the local
state emerging within this literature - as develop-
mental, entrepreneurial or 'local state corporatist' -
are reviewed in the following section.
3 Models of the Local State:
Entrepreneurial, Developmental or
Corporatist
As China's rapid growth unfolded, existing theory
failed to provide adequate explanations for local
development. Rather than resisting reform or los-
ing power in the process of market transition,
bureaucrats began to play a direct entrepreneurial
role. Their behaviour did not conform to the pre-
dictions of the literature on the politics of eco-
nomic liberalisation that rent-seeking officials
would resist reform or distort the market.5
Alternative 'models' were required, with Gordon
White in the forefront of their development, draw-
ing on his earlier work on the developmental state.
Models of the developmental and entrepreneurial
states (Blecher 1991; White 1991) and the local
corporatist state (Oi 1992) suggest ways in which
officials adapted and shaped economic reform to
the benefit of their localities. Their role as market
facilitators and entrepreneurs has been (poten-
tially) productive rather than purely rent-seeking.
In many cases it appears also to be redistributive
and welfare-oriented.
The principal dimensions of these models concern
the nature of bureaucratic adaptation to market
transition, the locus of entrepreneurship - in busi-
ness or government, the role of the state as facilita-
tor of, or participator in the market, and its
relationship with private business. While the dis-
tinctions between models may not be as clear in
reality as the initial formulations suggest, the over-
laps between them help to highlight the 'develop-
mental' purpose of the local state, which may be
entrepreneurial andlor corporatist, and may operate
both for the promotion of local economic develop-
ment and for the enhancement of social welfare.
The implications for welfare provision of changing
the incentives (particularly fiscal) and structures of
accountability within which local state develop-
ment has occurred will then be explored.
3.1 Developmental and entrepreneurial
local states
The notion of entrepreneurship had been largely
absent from relevant literatures - both on state
socialism - which has 'planners, not entrepreneurs'
(Blecher 199 1:266) and on the developmental state
where 'by and large entrepreneurship is conceptu-
alised as an activity undertaken by enterprises
which are implicitly or explicitly viewed as distinct
from the developmental state administration'
(Blecher 1991:266-7). Describing the concept of
'state entrepreneurship', White (1991) highlighted
the adaptability of the state, and the active institu-
tional response to opportunities opened up by mar-
ket reform and the changing politico-economic
environment. Both authors examined the distinctive
market-facilitating role of the 'entrepreneurial state'
- 'the process whereby individual levels of govern-
ment, state agencies and individual officials become
not only stimulants to but also participants in emer-
gent markets' (White 1996: 171). Local govern-
ments were seen to be 'acting as powerful and
effective agencies for local socio-economic develop-
ment. They are, in effect, mini 'developmental
states" (White and Benewick 1995:6).
Drawing on examples of development in two coun-
ties in the 1980s, Blecher distinguished clearly
between developmental and entrepreneurial states
by focusing on the locus of entrepreneurship and
the relationship of the enterprise to the state. Thus
'a developmental role of the state ... emphasises
entrepreneurship by state administrative or bureau-
cratic agencies as a central activity' in contrast to 'a
rather different developmental role for the state in
which entrepreneurship is undertaken by enter-
prises' (Blecher 1991:267). In the entrepreneurial
state conceptualisation, government bureaus
engage in entrepreneurial activity, not merely to
assist the agency in carrying out its assigned task,
but in order to earn profits (ibid: 267-8). It was this
behaviour which Gordon White more recently
observed in government welfare institutions, and
which formed the basis of his discussion of 'welfare
entrepreneurship'.
This work has evolved from early discussions e.g. Oi
(1988, 1992) to the most fully developed presentation in
Oi (1999).
Duckett (1996) also suggests that there may be a mixed
model of developmental and entrepreneurial states.
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3.2 The local corporate state
In her formulation of the local corporate state (LCS),6
Jean Oi also investigates the adaptability of cadres to
changing incentives in the transitional economy, pro-
viding a framework within which the local state may
be both entrepreneurial and developmental.7 Her
work is particularly concerned with the incentives
'embedded in the institutions that shape the actions
of officials' including the property rights regime, the
nature of centrallocal relations, and the fiscal sys-
tem. She suggests that where the risks or costs to
individuals were too high, the state - in Chinas case
the local government - had to step in and assume the
entrepreneurial role to start rural industry
Oi use of the term 'corporatism' differs from more
conventional usage and has evolved over time. It is
'not concerned with the role of the central state in
the vertical integration of interests within society as
a whole ... [but] is constituted and co-ordinated by
local government - specifically counties, townships
and villages' (11-12). Initially it referred to the run-
ning of village governments as a diversified corpo-
ration, redistributing income to their members and
giving members a stake (Oi 1988) raising the para-
dox that increasing industrialisation could
strengthen the corporate nature of the village, albeit
with a different character.8 The term has evolved to
refer to 'the degree to which the LCS has been able
to restrain the private sector from becoming an
independent economic class. Local governments
have used a combination of inducements and con-
straints to fashion a local corporatist system that
melds the entrepreneurial and governmental roles
of local governments' (1999: 138).
Oi 'developmental state' has both a market facilitat-
ing and redistributive role. Within a local corporatist
context, local officials turn the administrative bureau-
cracy into a channel for the flow of information and
resources to facilitate market production and serve
local economic growth (1999: 178). They can also
redistribute income among different sectors and
enterprises within the local corporate state. This
broader conceptualisation of entrepreneurial activity
See also Walder (1998) for a related argument at the
county level.
suggests that it may take place within developmental
local governments, in which case state entrepreneur-
ship may serve to promote broader developmental
objectives. Thus with sufficient incentives and
resources, bureaucracies can assume an entrepreneur-
ial role in promoting economic reform (Oi 1999:193).
3.3 The redisti-ibutive local state
I-low do these models of the local state assist in
understanding the allocation or use of resources cre-
ated by entrepreneurial governments, and what are
the implications for the provision and financing of
welfare? Just as local economic growth, and hence
improved incomes and living standards, depended
on the entrepreneurial drive to create a vibrant local
economy, so too the capacity to develop local welfare
services depends on the ability of the local state to
control some of these resources as well as their will-
ingness to finance such provision. In the literatures
on the local state and economic growth, references
are made to the use of resources for welfare promo-
tion, for example through the provision of employ-
ment to villagers and the use of funds to finance
welfare programmes or relief. Early work on TVEs,
for example, noted the dilemma faced by local offi-
cials wanting to be successful businessmen as well as
good government officials responsible for village
welfare (Byrd and Lin 1990).
The result is a continued redistributive role for the
state operating through different mechanisms. Under
the developmental or corporatist state, enterprises
(whether collectively or privately owned) most likely
to receive government assistance are those deemed
most capable of contributing to the 'corporate good',
the definition of which changes over time, but may
include social interests such as the provision of
employment, as well as profitability and growth (Oi
1999). In those villages where resources are available
to the collective, high levels of public services may be
provided. In many highly industrialised villages from
Guangdong to Shandong, the collective has effectively
taken over all responsibilities for welfare provision
through enterprise-raised funds. Thus in some cir-
cumstances reforms have led 'not to the end of redis-
tributive socialism but to a new form of redistributive
corporatism... the power of the local government has
grown along with the provision of collective welfare'
(Ql 1999:79-80). Enterprise ownership may be less
important in this process than the relationship
between government and business (whether collective
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or private) which determines the capacity of the local
state to marshall resources for redistribution towards
developmental purposes.
4 Welfare Creation by Local States
The local state, in the form of the village committee
and township government, is primarily responsible
for welfare provision and financing. This section
describes first the responsibilities of central and
local governments and, second, the availability of
various sources and mechanisms of financing;
finally, the relationships between available financing
mechanisms, the nature of the local state, and peas-
antcadre relations are discussed.
4.1 Responsibilities for welfare provision
Under the pre-reform collective system, rural welfare
provision was in principle comprehensive with pub-
lic provision of health care and education existing
alongside basic guarantees to relief and social assis-
tance for certain categories of people. In practice,
however, stark differences existed in levels of provi-
sion both between rural and urban populations and
between rural areas where individuals were depen-
dent ultimately on family and community economic
resources. Following decollectivisation, the govern-
ment has redefined its responsibilities towards the
rural population, limiting these to minimal forms of
relief and assistance to the very poor and destitute, to
specific vulnerable or deserving groups, and to those
affected by natural disasters. Major social security
programmes are summarised in Table 1.
This shift in responsibilities from the centre may
have little immediate impact in many rural areas.
Nonetheless, it represents a significant change of
principle, with implications for the financing and
delivery of services. While the main policies for
social assistance are defined by the central govern-
ment, provision has increasingly been devolved to
'society' - including local communities, mass organ-
isations, work units, families and individuals -
through a policy of welfare 'socialisation' (shehui-
hua) (Caireng 1995:229; Zhu and Pan 1994; L.
Wong 1998). The assumption is that the main
sources of livelihood protection will be self-pro-
vided (Leung and Nann 1995; Wong 1994).
Rural relief and social assistance are the domain of
the civil affairs system. Related programmes, such as
Table 1 Main Social Security Programmes
iii social insurance pension schemes
community health insurance schemes
insurance against disasters
insurance for employees of TVEs
insurance for public employees
health, education and employment involve relevant
systems under the ministries of health, education and
labour, with budget allocations from the treasury
Implementation takes place through agencies at dif-
ferent levels in the administrative hierarchy, involving
cooperation with and contributions from township-,
community- and village-level organisations, house-
holds and individuals. At the township level, social
welfare activities are co-ordinated by the local com-
mittee on social security and civil affairs led by the
director of the township government (Leung and
Nann 1995:103, 112). Responsibilities of these com-
mittees include provision of 'five guarantees' (wubao),
old people's homes, ad hoc assistance to poor house-
holds, and in some cases administration of insurance,
pension or cooperative medical schemes. The local
civil affairs bureau is also responsible for providing
'social preference' benefits, which often account for a
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individual contributions
collective welfare funds
employer provision
government budget
large proportion of local civil affairs budgets particu-
larly in poor or 'old revolutionary base' areas.
The role of the state in direct provision or financing
has declined since 1978. Overall the Ministry of Civil
Affairs budget has remained around 1.5 per cent of
state expenditure, declining marginally from 1.65 per
cent per year under the Sixth Five year plan (1981-85)
to 1.5 per cent under the Eighth Five-year plan
(1991-95) (Wong 1998:149). The 1980s saw a
decline in overall funding for rural relief by 50 per cent
in real terms with expenditures in poor areas experi-
encing the greatest decline. During fieldwork,9 govern-
ment officials at provincial and county, as well as
township levels, consistently mentioned that budget
allocations from higher levels are generally used first to
pay cadre wages and are often insufficient even for this
purpose.1° Poorer areas with greatest need and facing
Type of programme Main programmes Provider/financer
social relief and assistance payments in cash or kind to poor households collective welfare funds
material assistance to victims of natural disaster Civil Affairs budget, 'society',
donations
ii social welfare institutional care e.g., for the aged, disabled collective welfare funds
and orphans self-funding activities
welfare factories providing employment local government subsidies
for the disabled
iv social preference special payments to veterans, disabled soldiers, Cïvil Affairs and collective welfare
dependants of soldiers, demobilised and retired funds
soldiers etc.
y medical security curative health services Ministry of Health/budget
preventive services (immunisation and MCH) allocations
immunisation and MCH insurance schemes user fees
medical fee exemptions collective welfare funds
vi other mutual savings/credit societies individual contributions
minimum living standard guarantee county budget and collective
other e.g. childcare, activities for elderly welfare funds
collective funds
Fieldwork was undertaken in Guizhou, Hubei and Interviews: Guizhou and Hubei, 1998.
Shandong between February and May 1998 by the
author and researchers from the Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Beijing. The following sections draw on this research.
Table 2: Social welfare relief funds
relatively heavier burdens in meeting nationally set
wages, tend to receive fewest transfers, but to have the
weakest capacity to raise funds locally. When com-
pared with the growth in labour insurance and welfare
funds for the urban population the imbalance is more
stark: in 1995 state spending on civil affairs was only
4.4 per cent of such expenditure (C. Wong 1998:151).
4.2 Local sources of welfare finance
The above discussion indicates the responsibilities
of the collective for local welfare provision, but the
lack of corresponding funds. The breakdown
between central and collective revenues and expen-
ditures is seen from official data in Table 2. Actual
provision thus depends crucially on locally available
resources. The result is the proliferation of multiple
channels of funding as the local state seeks ways to
meet its obligations, including fees and levies on
farmers and businesses, entrepreneurial activities by
the state, welfare lotteries and welfare 'enterprises'.
The 5 per cent limit refers to all levies, not just those
for welfare purposes. There are frequent reports of levies
exceeding this amount, while the limit leads to
incentives for the government to inflare reports of
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The individual or household is increasingly responsi-
ble for self-provision; rural health and education are
now predominantly privately financed through user
fees. Households also make a major contribution to
welfare funds (gongyijin) which are collected and allo-
cated at the village or township level, with fees and
levies on farmers remaining the primary source.
Levies (tiliu and tongchou) are imposed on rural resi-
dents, usually on a per capita basis. Due to the pro-
liferation of extra-statutory charges on farmers to
meet local financing requirements, the central gov-
ernment has set a limit on the amount that can he
raised of 5 per cent average per capita village
income." Collective enterprises also contribute to
these welfare funds, while in villages with high levels
of enterprise development, and thus non-agricultural
employment, welfare provision may be financed
exclusively through enterprise-raised funds.'2
Most relief and social preference expenditures are
financed from these welfare funds. Welfare homes are
average income in order to increase the amount which
can be collected.
'Interviews: Jiaozhou, 1998. Linda Wong notes similar
developments in Guandong (1998:76).
(10 000 Yuan)
Item 1985 1990 1995 1997
National Total 218349 426772 797289 1077496
Government funds 71097 202456 375313 461710
Collective funds 147252 224316 421976 615786
Funds for family members of martyrs and
disabled veterans
106983 242732 435359 615411
Government funds 35328 141163 240980 293670
Collective funds 71655 101569 194379 321741
Funds for poor households 28688 38744 56210 75088
Government funds 11826 18650 26867 36127
Collective funds 16863 20094 29343 38961
Five guarantee funds (wubao) 55196 85052 160121 196951
Government funds 6693 11851 22277 26545
Collective funds 48503 73201 137844 170406
Funds for urban and rural welfare homes
of all types
27483 60245 145599 190046
Homes for disabled vererans 3040 6213 11737 17095
Government funds 2911 5920 10920 15966
Collective funds 129 293 817 1129
Social welfare homes 24443 54032 133862 172951
Government funds 14340 24873 74269 89402
Collective funds 10103 29t59 59593 83549
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1997:737; 1998:793
Table 3: Extra-budgetary revenue and expenditures of central and local governments
(100 million yuan)
funded partly from civil affairs budgets, township
extra-budgetary funds (including remittances and
public welfare funds of township enterprises), and in
richer villages from the collective funds derived from
village enterprises, run by village committees. In
addition, many institutions responsible for the care
of the elderly or disabled have started 'welfare enter-
prises' or operate other income-generating activities
which enjoy tax reductions or are provided with var-
ious forms of support from the township such as
allocation of land or subsidised essential services.13 In
some areas welfare lotteries have been established to
provide an additional source of local finance.
Social insurance is increasingly seen as an alterna-
tive source of funding for relief and assistance, as
well as a mechanism for expanding the rural social
security system. Two major initiatives are in areas of
community health insurance and rural pensions (or
old age insurance), although other insurance
schemes include crop insurance, housing and vari-
ous forms of personal insurance as well as insurance
for government and TVE employees, which may be
organised by public or commercial agencies.
Contributions to government-run insurance or pen-
sion schemes either may be collected from individ-
uals on a voluntary basis, as part of regular
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compulsory levies, or paid from collective funds
raised from other sources, including enterprises.'4
Funds raised by the collectives are part of the off-
budget funds which have received increasing atten-
tion in recent years. The decentralisation of the fiscal
system gave rise to two forms of off-budget finance
- extra-budgetary funds (yusuanwai zijin) under the
control of local governments and administrative
agencies and self-raised funds (zichou zijin) at the
county and township levels. The ability to retain
these revenues was a key incentive to the promotion
of enterprises by localities and administrative agen-
cies. While accurate data on these funds is inevitably
hard to obtain, it is clear that their scale is consider-
able. According to official aggregate statistics, in
1993 off-budget funds accounted for about 36 per
cent of total revenues. Local studies point to consid-
erably higher proportions, particularly at the town-
ship level (Wong 1997:59; Fan 1998).
Comparing the division of expenditure responsibil-
ities among administrative levels Wong also notes
that lower levels (the township) are remitting more
than they retain (see Table 3). These levels bear the
main burden of local government financing respon-
sibilities, including wage increases, which have
Year Total extra-
budgetary
revenue
Central
government
Local
government
Total extra-
budgetary
expenditure
Central
government
Local
government
1985 1530.03 636.10 893.93 1375.03 562.05 812.98
1986 1737.31 716.63 1020.68 1578.37 640.94 937.43
1987 2028.80 828.03 1200.77 1840.75 741.61 1099.14
1988 2360.77 907.15 1453.62 2145.27 842.86 1302.41
1989 2658.83 1072.28 1586.55 2503.10 975.87 1527.23
1990 2708.64 1073.28 1635.36 2707.06 1037.69 1669.37
1991 3243.30 1381.10 1862.20 3092.26 1263.27 1828.99
1992 3854.92 1707.73 2147.19 3649.90 1592.81 2057.09
1993* 1432.54 245.90 1186.64 1314.30 198.87 1115.43
1994 1862.53 283.32 1579.21 1710.39 225.02 1485.37
1995 2406.50 317.57 2088.93 2331.26 351.38 1979.88
1996 3893.34 947.66 2945.68 3838.32 1034.92 2803.40
*The coverage of extra-budgetary revenue and expenditures was adjusted in 1993 and the subsequent data are not
comparable with those from previous years.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years
Interviews, Enshi, 1998. "Interviews, Hubei, 1998.
exceeded the average rate of price inflation and
have pushed up the costs of administration and ser-
vice provision (Wong 1997:58). Thus, even as local
states are being entrepreneurial, pressures are
increasing on local budgets and the share of
resources available for welfare is likely to be
squeezed as localities try to meet administrative and
wage costs. In a climate of growing competition
between enterprises, and a slow-down in overall
growth, the resources available to local states for
redistributive or welfare purposes may well be
threatened.
4.3 Finance, accountability and
peasant-cadre relations
Responsïbility for the livelihoods and welfare of the
rural population, and the need to create resources
with which to fulfil this role, place potentially con-
tradictory demands on local officials. Either they
can raise funds through directly entrepreneurial
activities or from private enterprise; alternatively,
they must raise funds from the very constituency
for whose welfare they are responsible. These
options may either strengthen their position - if
they are able to create resources and use them for
developmental or welfare purposes; or weaken
them - if they create resources but fail to use them
to benefit the community, or if they fail to create
such resources, except by impositions on villagers.
In all cases there are implications for the future of
the local state in an era of more intense market
competition leading to possibly tighter budget con-
straints. Peasantcadre relations will be a key ele-
ment in these developments.
A major source of tension between peasants and
cadres in recent years has been the burden of collec-
tive fees. These tensions arise not only from the
absolute level of fees but also from perceptions of
what the money is being used for, and the commit-
ment of officials to local development. In townships
with sources of collective finance, whether relatively
wealthy or poor, relations between villagers and
leaders were generally better than in those without.
The latter (again regardless of income level), can be
broadly categorised in two types. First, those which
(based on comparisons with neighbouring areas)
potentially could have promoted greater local devel-
opment, but where government appears to have few
developmental or entrepreneurial aspirations. In
these areas, township and village leaders seemed to
68
resort rapidly to additional levies on farmers to meet
any new obligation (such as pension or insurance
schemes) imposed from above, generating increas-
ingly high levels of tension between farmers and the
state. Second are those townships with few entre-
preneurial opportunities, which tend to be located
in the poorer areas. In the fieldwork sites, the
strongest points of contention were over the imposi-
tion of fees that led to no direct or visible gain for the
community; or where villagers' preferences over use
were ignored. In one case, funds were withheld by
villagers in protest at the relocation of the local
school to a neighbouring village.
These tensions are not new The 5 per cent limit on
levies was introduced in response to protests against
rising extra-statutory charges. Two additional insti-
tutional changes are now being introduced that, in
theory, have the potential to reduce these tensions.
First are fiscal reforms to rein in some of the off-
budget funds by converting fees to taxes (feigaishui).
1vVhile the implications at the sub-county level are
not yet clear, sources of funding for the local state
will almost certainly be affected. Second, the village
governance agenda, involving elections and, per-
haps more importantly, the development of mecha-
nisms of financial accountability at village and
township levels, may create greater openness, par-
ticularly in areas where farmers are the main source
of collective revenue.
5 Conclusion
What are the implications of these two important
reform agendas, and how do they relate to discus-
sions of the local state and welfare provision? While
both may potentially relieve some sources of ten-
sion in local statesociety relations, it is also possi-
ble that they will work in contradictory directions.
While villagers are provided with stronger mecha-
nisms for holding officials accountable, the capacity
of officials to control income sources with which
they can provide collective goods may be compro-
mised. The outcomes will depend in part on prior
local conditions and villagers' expectations. In more
industrialised townships, where all services are pro-
vided by enterprise-raised funds, officials expressed
concern about how residents would react if funds
had again to be raised directly from them in the
event of a down-turn in the economy reducing rev-
enues from enterprises.
While fiscal reform and rationalisation may be neces-
sary this may also impose costs on entrepreneurial
developmental states. One of the casualties may be
rural welfare provision. Equally, for those collectives
with limited opportunities to raise resources (but
possibly developmental intentions) there is little indi-
cation that more transfers will be available. On the
contrary the devolution of responsibility from central
to local state and society involves a strong emphasis
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